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Abstract
Falling oil prices are leading to a reduction in domestic demand and lowering of 
the  ruble exchange rate, thus enhancing the price competitiveness of Russian producers and 
stimulating the  supply side of the economy (especially in foreign markets unaffected by 
the recession). Indeed, all of this create the possibility of offsetting the decline in domestic 
demand to a varying degree through increased net exports. However, the present study shows 
that, taking into account all of the structural problems of the Russian economy, the devalu-
ation of the ruble may lead to a more severe recession than anticipated by most experts in 
their estimates, judging by average consensus forecasts (as of the end of September 2015). 
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1. Introduction. One year after the Russian exchange rate shock:  
an overall balance of short-term effects
The devaluation of the Russian ruble, which followed falling oil prices and the im-
SRVLWLRQRI¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQVLQDQG1 is having a controversial  impact 
RQWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHUHGXFHGLQÀRZRIIRUHLJQFXUUHQF\
 ً The updated English version of the article published in Russian in Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2015, No. 12, 
pp. 5–31. This paper was prepared as part of the projects for 2015, led by the Fund for Fundamental Research, 
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.
  E-mail address: vmironov@hse.ru. 
  Peer review under responsibility of Voprosy Ekonomiki.
 1 +HUHLQDIWHUZHLQWHUSUHWWKHWHUP³GHYDOXDWLRQ´ERWKDVDGHYDOXDWLRQSHUVHFDXVHGE\DVKDUSGHFOLQHLQ
WKHQRPLQDOH[FKDQJHUDWHRIDQDWLRQDOFXUUHQF\GXULQJWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPD¿[HGWRDÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWH
DQGDVDGHSUHFLDWLRQGXHWRLWVIDOOLQJQRPLQDOH[FKDQJHUDWHXQGHUFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHIUHHÀRDWLQJUHJLPH
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2015.12.005 
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG
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DQGLQFUHDVLQJLQÀDWLRQDUHFDXVLQJDUHGXFWLRQLQDJJUHJDWHGHPDQG0RUHRYHUDV
QHDUO\DOZD\VRFFXUVGXULQJDVKRFNGHYDOXDWLRQH[LVWLQJ¿QDQFLDOSUREOHPVKDYH
become more acute. In particular, foreign debt payments are becoming more expen-
sive in ruble terms. On the other hand, in the tradable sectors of the economy, prices 
and expenses are decreasing in currency terms against trading partners under the ef-
fect of the ruble devaluation, improving the competitiveness of domestic producers 
and, consequently, offering potential for growth in the proportion of exports in out-
put and for a reduction in the proportion of imports in domestic demand. 
The net impact on the economy, i.e., the balance between the negative impact 
RI IDOOLQJRLOSULFHVDQG WKHSRVLWLYH LQÀXHQFHRI LPSURYHGFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV LV
currently unclear. For example, although retail turnover fell by 8.2% y-o-y in 
-DQXDU\±$XJXVWWRWDOLQYHVWPHQWFRQWUDFWHGE\DQGLQGXVWULDOSURGXF-
tion and GDP declined by 3.2% and 3.5%, respectively. Meanwhile, the decreas-
ing real exchange rate of the ruble is creating nothing more than mere potential 
economic growth in the future. It would require consi derable time and effort to 
UHYDPSWKHEXVLQHVVPRGHOVDQGJHRJUDSKLFDQGVHFWRUDOSURGXFWLRQFRQ¿JXUD-
tions and to enter foreign markets with new products.
2QWKHZKROHDFFRUGLQJWRWKH%DQNRI5XVVLDLQ-DQXDU\±$XJXVWWKHUHDO
effective exchange rate of the ruble dropped by 18.6% y-o-y (Fig. 1), whereas ac-
cording to our estimates, unit labor costs fell by approximately 27% in currency 
WHUPVDFURVVWKHLQGXVWU\LQJHQHUDODQGE\LQPDQXIDFWXULQJRYHUWKH¿UVWKDOI
of the year (Fig. 2). In industrial sectors, where output continues to grow despite 
the general recession (chemicals, food, oil products, non-fuel mining and minerals ), 
unit labor costs have contracted to an even greater extent, and this contraction may 
prove to be a factor that encourages growth. 
The basic indicators of the Russian economy’s competitive performance, i.e., 
the real exchange rate of the ruble and unit labor costs, returned to 2004–2005 
levels (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2), when the explosive growth of oil prices stimulated 
demand, although this undermined the economy’s international competitiveness. 
The latter was manifested in the strengthening of the real effective exchange 
rate of the ruble by an annual average of 5% from 2004 to 2013 (equivalent to 
Fig. 1. 5HDOHIIHFWLYHH[FKDQJHUDWHVRIWKHUXEOHDQG%5,&6FXUUHQFLHVIURPWKURXJK$XJXVW
(1997 = 100%).
Sources: %DQNIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HWWOHPHQWVDXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
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the growth in relative prices for Russian goods in currency terms by the same 
value). Rising oil prices (accompanied by structural labor scarcity due to low mo-
bility) also led to faster wages increases compared to labor productivity growth 
and to an increasing ratio of wages to total revenues for the manufacturing indus-
try, from approximately 6% in 2006 to 16–17% currently (Fig. 3). 
In the absence of economic overheating in the majority of Russia’s trading 
partner economies, the recent ruble devaluation can be viewed as a type of 
³IRUHLJQH[FKDQJHZDU´LHDPHWKRGIRUVSRQWDQHRXVO\UHGLVWULEXWLQJGHPDQG
in favor of the devaluing country. It can also be con sidered a cure for the Dutch 
disease, which as many recent papers have proven exists in the Russian economy 
Fig. 2. 8QLWODERUFRVWV8/&LQFXUUHQF\WHUPVIRU5XVVLDQPDQXIDFWXULQJIURPWKURXJK 
(the left-hand scale shows the y-o-y growth rate).
Sources: 5RVVWDW%DQNRI5XVVLDDXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
Fig. 3. Proportion of wages to value of products shipped (%).
Sources: 5RVVWDW%DQNRI5XVVLDDXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
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VHH'OJHUHWDO7DEDWD(JHUW$OJLHUL%HIRUHWKHVH
papers however, the existence of this phenomenon was largely denied.
Simultaneously, all of the events related to the exchange rate shock are occur-
ring against the backdrop of the ongoing recession in Russia, which has its own 
VSHFL¿FFKDUDFWHULVWLFV2QWKHRQHKDQGLWZDVFDXVHGE\WKHVORZGRZQLQHFR-
nomic growth that began in 2011, apparently resulting from structural im balances. 
On the other hand however, unlike the crises in 1998 and 2008–2009, this is not 
a recession of inventories but, to a great extent, a recession of demand (Fig. 4), 
which may (all other conditions being equal) alleviate it but hinder the process 
of overcoming it.2$JDLQVWZHDNLQYHVWPHQWDFWLYLW\DQGORZKRXVHKROGGHPDQG
it is devaluation that — provided that a number of conditions are met at the micro 
and macro levels — is expected to factor into accelerating Russia’s economic 
growth through a greater contribution of net exports to GDP. 
7KHUHDUHUHDVRQVIRUWKHVHH[SHFWDWLRQV$WWHPSWVWRXVHGHYDOXDWLRQDVDVKRUW
term incentive for economic acceleration are indeed in line with the global expe-
rience. Indeed, according to said experience a short-term recovery relies on a very 
limited number of standard measures involving the positive impact on the psycho-
logy and expectations of economic agents, the elimination of government failures 
 2 During the previous crises in Russia, nearly 3/4 of the total GDP decline was caused by the selling off of 
surplus inventories accumulated earlier rather than by lower demand per se. For example, according to Rosstat 
survey data processed by the Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge, National Research 
8QLYHUVLW\+LJKHU6FKRRORI(FRQRPLFVWKHPDMRULW\RIUHVSRQGHQWVEHOLHYHG¿QLVKHGSURGXFWLQYHQWRULHVWREH
H[FHVVLYHLQHDUO\$FFRUGLQJWRWKHVDPHVXUYH\VWKHFXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQLVH[DFWO\WKHRSSRVLWHZKLFK²DOO
other conditions being equal — suggests a potentially less severe recession now than during the previous two 
FULVHV+RZHYHUWKHUHLVDUHYHUVHVLGHWKHSRWHQWLDOODFNRIDQHJDWLYH³LQYHQWRU\DFFHOHUDWRU´PD\SUHYHQW
Russia’s traditionally high post-crisis recovery rate (a V-like recession).
Fig. 4. GDP trends (in increments compared to the respective quarter of the previous year, %)  
and contributions from components by type of demand (p.p.)
Sources:5RVVWDWFDOFXODWLRQVE\ WKH&HQWUHRI'HYHORSPHQW,QVWLWXWH1DWLRQDO5HVHDUFK8QLYHUVLW\+LJKHU
School of Economics.
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ZLWKD³GHEXUHDXFUDWL]DWLRQ´RIWKHHFRQRP\3 and, sometimes, the devaluation 
of a national currency, giving domestic producers a chance to increase output. This 
is especially important for resource-based economies, where institutions tend to 
be weak, corruption is high, and the traditional selective industrial policy is not ef-
fective. Meanwhile, devaluation is not selective in its impact on economic agents. 
Experts who expect the Russian economy to recover quickly also base their 
optimism on the fact that, unlike the 1998 and 2008–2009 crises, the recent de-
valuation of the ruble occurred in two stages (late 2014 and the summer of  2015), 
whereas the adverse consequences of a protracted devaluation tend to become 
somewhat milder due to gradual adaptation of the economy to the exchange rate 
shock.4 In addition to this, the pre-devaluation weakness of economies  typically 
enhances the positive response of output to devaluation. However, the insta bility 
RIWKH¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUZKLFKLVDOVRUHOHYDQWWRWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\WRGD\HVSH-
cially taking into account the sanctions) makes this response considerably weaker 
,0)&K
$TXHVWLRQDULVHVDVWRKRZWKHFXUUHQWO\XQVWDEOHVLWXDWLRQLQWKHRLODQGIRUHLJQ
exchange market may affect the Russian economy. Will the decreasing real ex-
change rate for the ruble and decreasing unit labor costs offer production growth 
LQFHQWLYHVZKLFKDUHVXI¿FLHQWO\VWURQJWRRIIVHWVKULQNLQJGHPDQGDQGHQFRXUDJH
a speedy recovery from the recession? How can we close the gap in the development 
of the tradable sectors (industry and agriculture) affected by the Dutch  disease? Do 
they have the potential to increase their output quickly? What can be done to achieve 
this outcome? Is it achieved through a classical increase in net exports by growing 
non-commodity exports and import substitution? In addition and given the depen-
dence of Russian exports on commodities that are not very price elastic, is over-
FRPLQJWKHUHFHVVLRQDQGWKHH[FKDQJHUDWHVKRFNJRLQJWREHVSHFL¿FDQGSURWUDFW-
ed over time? What type of macroeconomic policy should be pursued in this case?
2. An analysis of the impact of devaluation on macro indicators  
and output: a literature review
In our opinion, papers that have studied the effects of national currency de-
valuation on output and other macroeconomic indicators should be considered 
VHSDUDWHO\IURPWKHVRXUFHVZKLFKDUHIDUOHVVQXPHURXVGHYRWHGWRDQDO\]LQJ
the impact of an undervalued or balanced (after a period of overvaluation) ex-
change rate on economic growth.5 $V DQ LQGLFDWRU RI WKHQDWLRQDO FXUUHQF\
 3 Read more on this matter in, e.g., Rodrik, 2005.
 4 $SDSHUE\%XVVLqUHHWDOZKLFKVXPVXSWKHH[SHULHQFHIURPGHYDOXDWLRQVLQPRUHWKDQFRXQWULHV
between 1960 and 2006, demonstrated that output losses from pre-devaluation slowdowns in the form of 
trend deviations account for 5% to 7% of GDP in the medium term in the event of a one-time devaluation and 
approximately 6.3% in the event of a two-stage devaluation of a national currency. 
 5 $FFRUGLQJWRVRPHVWXGLHVLQYROYLQJDODUJHVDPSOHRIFRXQWULHVDUHGXFWLRQLQWKHRYHUYDOXHGH[FKDQJH
rate of the national currency (not necessarily shock-like) to below the equilibrium level in developing countries 
eventually leads to accelerated economic growth. However, this occurs less because of fast-growing exports 
and rapidly declining imports, as one might expect based on an analogy with devaluations and exchange rate 
shocks, but more because of an increase in savings and deposits in the national banking system and investments, 
WRJHWKHUZLWK GHFUHDVLQJ XQHPSOR\PHQW VHH*OX]PDQQ HWDO /HY\<H\DWL DQG6WXU]HQHJJHU 
0HDQZKLOH WKHDXWKRUV HPSKDVL]HG WKHLPSRUWDQFH RI QRW DOORZLQJ WKHFRXQWU\¶V GRPHVWLF SUREOHPV SRRU
investment climate , political instability, etc.) to drive the increased savings out over the border in the form of 
FDSLWDOÀLJKWDQGDFTXLVLWLRQVRIIRUHLJQDVVHWVDVRFFXUUHGLQ$UJHQWLQDGXULQJWKHPLGVIRUH[DPSOH
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XQGHUYDOXDWLRQWKHVHSDSHUVKDYHXVHGDVSHFL¿FLQGLFDWRUFRPELQLQJLWVOHYHOLQ
relation to both the purchasing power parity and GDP per capita against its level 
in developed countries.6$QHJDWLYHYDOXHIRUWKLVLQGLFDWRUGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\
mean a shock-like fall of the exchange rate, i.e., devaluation, the economic effect 
of which we consider in this article.
$OWKRXJK GHYDOXDWLRQ LV RIWHQ FRQVLGHUHG WR EH DQ LQFHQWLYH IRU HFRQRPLF
JURZWKIRUDORQJSHULRGRIWLPHWKHVFLHQWL¿FOLWHUDWXUHKDVVKRZQDPRUHVNHSWL
cal attitude of the authors towards it, more often attributing any positive effects 
to instances of devaluation in developed countries (see Gylfason and Schmid, 
&RRSHUZDVWKH¿UVWWRLGHQWLI\DW\SHRI³GHYDOXDWLRQSHVVLPLVP´
in his classical paper, where a predominantly descriptive analysis, characteristic 
RIZRUNVRQWKHVXEMHFWLQWKDWSHULRGSURYLGHVDEDVLVIRUVWXG\LQJWKHLQÀXHQFH
of devaluations on aggregate demand (foreign trade balance, budget spending, 
net tax proceeds) and on the money supply in the economy. The author shows 
that, although devaluations typically have a positive effect on economic activity, 
their short-term (year-long) effect was largely restrictive based on his sample of 
19 countries that experienced 24 devaluations from 1959 to 1966. 
,QDQDO\]LQJGDWDIURPFRXQWULHVGXULQJWKHSHULRGVSDQQLQJWR
.DPLQH[WHQGHGWKHKRUL]RQRIDQDO\VLVE\VWXG\LQJWKHWKUHH\HDUVEHIRUH
and the three years after the devaluation. He noted that a sharp slowdown in GDP 
growth (by 2 p.p.) began a year before the devaluation and continued during the ac-
tual year of the devaluation. Following this, over three years, the growth rates were 
approximately 1 p.p. higher than in the devaluation year, although the GDP did not 
IXOO\UHFRYHUGXULQJWKDWSHULRG7KLVSDSHUVHHPVWREHWKH¿UVWWRKDYHGLVFRYHUHG
DSUHGHYDOXDWLRQVORZGRZQLQRXWSXWVHHDOVR%XVVLqUHHWDO
,QWKHLUSDSHU&DOYRDQG5HLQKDUWEDVHGRQDGHVFULSWLYHDQDO\VLVRI
nearly 100 devaluations between the 1970s and the 1990s, reached the conclusion 
WKDWRQDYHUDJHLQWKH¿UVW\HDUIROORZLQJDGHYDOXDWLRQLQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV
GDP growth rates dropped by approximately 2 p.p. against the pre-devalu ation 
OHYHODQGDFKLHYHGDOPRVWQRLQFUHDVHGXULQJWKHVHFRQG\HDU$QXPEHURIRWKHU
works have shown that, very frequently, devaluation does not serve as an ef-
¿FLHQWWRROIRUJURZLQJRXWSXWLQWKHVKRUWDQGPHGLXPWHUPHVSHFLDOO\LQOHVV
GHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV.UXJPDQDQG7D\ORU6KHHKH\0XVWDID
Frankel, 2005). 
In particular, Krugman and Taylor (1978) provided an explanation that, al-
WKRXJKWKHJRYHUQPHQWRIDQ\FRXQWU\JHQHUDOO\KDVDWKHRUHWLFDOO\MXVWL¿HGRS-
SRUWXQLW\WRWXUQWR¿VFDODQGPRQHWDU\SROLFLHVWR¿JKWWKHUHGXFWLRQLQDJJUHJDWH
demand caused by devaluation and to avoid a recession, governments of less 
GHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVDUHQRWVXI¿FLHQWO\ÀH[LEOHWRSXUVXHWKLVFRXUVHRIDFWLRQ
&DOYRDQG5HLQKDUWQRWHGWKHIROORZLQJSUREOHPVW\SLFDORIGHYHORS-
ing countries, related to devaluations and that have a negative effect on the pros-
pects for their recovery after an exchange rate shock:
x VXGGHQVWRSZKHQDRQHWLPHFORVXUHRIDFFHVVWRLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOPDU-
NHWVKDVDQDGYHUVHLPSDFWRQWKHHFRQRP\
x change in access to global capital markets (degradation of a country’s credit 
UDWLQJZLWKORZFUHGLWZRUWKLQHVVRIWHQEHFRPLQJDSHUVLVWHQWLVVXH
 6 This type of indicator used to be applied by Rodrik (2008).
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x high volatility of the real exchange rate, which undermines foreign trade in 
LQGXVWULDOFRXQWULHVDQG
x devaluation of a developing country’s currency often causes explosive growth 
LQLQÀDWLRQDQGDVXFFHVVLRQRIUHSHDWHGGHYDOXDWLRQV
The restrictive effect of devaluations on developing countries may be the result of 
an increase in prices for the imported equipment due to a sharp decline in the na tional 
FXUUHQF\H[FKDQJHUDWH)RUH[DPSOH%OHFNHUDQG5D]PLGHPRQVWUDWHWKDW
devaluation of a developing country’s currency against those of de veloped countries 
is restrictive in terms of output in the short term but is expansionist with respect to 
the currencies of other developing countries. The increase in prices for the imported 
equipment may be the reason behind the restrictive impact of devaluations in coun-
tries with manufactured export products and the positive effect in countries that ex-
port agricultural products (Nunnenkamp and Schweickert, 1990). 
In a paper by Domac (1997), which is dedicated to studying currency instability 
and devaluation in Turkey between 1960 and 1970, the literature review identi-
¿HGIRXUHPSLULFDODSSURDFKHVWRDQDO\]LQJWKHLPSDFWRIGHYDOXDWLRQVRQRXWSXW
the use of a control group as basis (enabling a distinction to be drawn between 
WKHHIIHFW RI GHYDOXDWLRQV RQ RXWSXW DQG WKHLQÀXHQFH RI RWKHU IDFWRUV EHIRUH
DQGDIWHUDPDFURPRGHOVLPXODWLRQDQGDQHFRQRPHWULFDSSURDFK7KHDXWKRU
illustrated the diversity of empirical approaches to the problem by citing 22 papers , 
only 6 of which used econometric methods. 
In the 21st century, researchers have maintained the intensity of their atten-
WLRQRQDQDO\]LQJWKHLPSDFWRIGHYDOXDWLRQVRQRXWSXWZKLOHH[SDQGLQJWKHUDQJH
RI WRROVXVHG$XWKRUVRIWHQDWWHPSW WRXVHPRGHUQHFRQRPHWULF WHFKQLTXHV WR
evaluate not only the short- and medium-term effects but also the long-term ef-
fects of devaluations on output. However, the results have been as controversial 
DV WKRVHRISUHYLRXV¿QGLQJV6WXGLHV LGHQWL¿HGQHXWUDO HIIHFWVRIQRPLQDOGH-
valuations on output in less developed countries between 1970 and 1990, both 
VKRUWWHUP DQG ORQJWHUP %DKPDQL2VNRRHH  ,QGHHG IROORZLQJ WKLV
DQXPEHURISDSHUVFRQ¿UPHGWKDWWKH¿QGLQJDOVRDSSOLHGWR$VLDQHFRQRPLHV7 
VHH8SDGK\D\D8SDGK\D\DDQG8SDGK\D\&KRXDQG&KDR
6LPXOWDQHRXVO\8SDGK\D\DHYHQLGHQWL¿HGDUHVWULFWLYHLPSDFWRQRXWSXW
from devaluations in Pakistan and Thailand, the impact having been registered by 
&KULVWRSRXORVLQDVDPSOHRI$VLDQHFRQRPLHVIURPWR,W
was later shown that, over the long-term, devaluations impeded economic growth 
in Indonesia and Malaysia but encouraged it in the Philippines and Thailand and 
WKDW .RUHD¶V RXWSXW ZDV QHXWUDO WR H[FKDQJH UDWH FKDQJHV %DKPDQL2VNRRHH
ɟWDO$VDJHQHUDOFRQFOXVLRQZHFDQQRWHWKHFRQWURYHUV\EHWZHHQHVWL-
mates close in time to each other within the same countries. Indeed, this indicates 
that the results are sensitive to the tools used and highlights the importance of 
taking this fact into account in further studies regarding the general effects of 
devaluations on output.
$QRWKHUFRQFOXVLRQGUDZQ IURP WKHDQDO\VLVRISDSHUVZULWWHQRYHU WKHSDVW
VHYHUDO\HDUV LV WKDW WKHUHVXOWVDUHFRXQWU\VSHFL¿F,QWKHLUZRUN*XSWDHWDO
(2007) described changes in output caused by 195 cases of devaluation in de-
veloping countries from 1970 to 2000. The authors showed that, in 60% of 
 7 India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
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the cases, exchange rate crises restricted output growth but had a positive effect 
on output in the remaining 40% of devaluations. Kalyoncu et al. (2008) modelled 
the correlation between real output and real exchange rate, using the model pre-
YLRXVO\SURSRVHGE\&KULVWRSRXORVDQGFRLQWHJUDWLRQPHWKRGVWRVWXG\
WKHORQJWHUPLPSDFWRIQDWLRQDOFXUUHQF\GHYDOXDWLRQVRQRXWSXW LQ2(&'
countries from 1985 to 2005, based on quarterly data. They found a clearly de-
¿QHG ORQJWHUP LPSDFWRI GHYDOXDWLRQRQRXWSXW LQQLQH FDVHVZLWK VL[EHLQJ
 negative and three being positive. Equally diverse results were produced by 
DQDO\]LQJGHYDOXDWLRQVLQ$IULFDQFRXQWULHVEDVHGRQDQQXDOGDWDIURP
WR%DKPDQL2VNRRHHDQG*HODQ
$VWKHOLWHUDWXUHUHYHDOVWKHVWLPXODWLQJHIIHFWRIGHYDOXDWLRQVRQWKHHFRQRP\
is heavily based on high export and import elasticities against exchange rate move-
ments and on the devaluing country’s macroeconomic policy, ensuring a stable 
UHDOGHYDOXDWLRQLHKDYLQJDQDQWLLQÀDWLRQDU\IRFXV7KHIDLOXUHWRPHHWWKHVH
two conditions will cause devaluations to be restrictive on output in the best case 
and destructive in the worst case. Then, before the price-driven stimulating effect 
of a devaluation is exhausted, GDP will either barely recover to pre-crises levels 
(and crisis typically accompanies devaluation) or stay below them. 
On the whole, empirical studies assessing the aftermath of exchange rate shocks 
and devaluations, based on data from 1969 to 2015, proved that they often have 
a restrictive effect on short-term economic growth. This effect may be caused, 
LQWHUDOLDE\WKHIDFWWKDWGHYDOXDWLRQW\SLFDOO\OHDGVWRD¿QDQFLDOFULVLVZKLFK
is manifested through degraded credit ratings. Moreover, it increases uncertainty 
and undermines investment activity, particularly due to the nearly doubled prob-
DELOLW\WKDWWKHKHDGVRI¿QDQFLDODQGHFRQRPLFDXWKRULWLHVZLOOEHUHSODFHGGXU-
LQJWKH¿UVW\HDUIROORZLQJWKHGHYDOXDWLRQLQDGGLWLRQWRDOLNHO\DEUXSWVKLIWLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOFRXUVHRIWKHFRXQWU\VHH&RRSHU)UDQNHO/HY\<H\DWL
DQG6WXU]HQHJJHU
Meanwhile, as the analysis of the literature shows, theoretical arguments in 
favor of the adverse impacts of devaluation on economic growth are linked: ¿UVW 
to the effect from redistributing income from economic agents with a high pro-
pensity to consume to agents with a low propensity, thereby leading to a decline 
LQ DJJUHJDWH GHPDQG DQG RXWSXW VHH HJ'LD]$OHMDQGUR  second, to 
WKHHIIHFWRIDFFHOHUDWLQJLQÀDWLRQZKHUHDQRPLQDOGHYDOXDWLRQPD\FDXVHDUH-
GXFWLRQLQDJJUHJDWHGHPDQGGXHWRXQFRQWUROOHGSULFHJURZWK)UDQNHO
and third, to low export and import price elasticity, where the balance of trade, 
H[SUHVVHG LQ WKHQDWLRQDO FXUUHQF\ PD\ GHFUHDVH FDXVLQJ D UHFHVVLRQ %ODQN
HWDO.DO\RQFXHWDO,QWKHODWWHUFDVHWKHJRYHUQPHQWRIDFRXQ-
try where the national currency devaluation is probable may show pessimism 
ZLWKUHVSHFW WR LWVSRWHQWLDOFRQVHTXHQFHVDQGVKRZDGHVLUH WRSRVWSRQH LW LQ
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVWKLVSHVVLPLVPLVRIWHQMXVWL¿HG
Fourth, in addition to the negative impacts on demand, devaluations may have 
an adverse effect on supply due to the appreciation of imported intermediate 
goods, increases in real interest rates, and increases in wages caused by the ac-
FHOHUDWLQJLQÀDWLRQ.UXJPDQDQG7D\ORUIRFXVHGRQWKLVDVSHFWLQWKHLU
ZHOONQRZQZRUNZKHUHWKH\ZHUHWKH¿UVWWRVWXG\WKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFK
devaluations have no stimulating effect on GDP, as had been asserted in most 
papers during the 1970s and 1980s.
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3. Income redistribution and a low propensity to invest as factors 
in the negative impact of devaluation on output
One of the theoretical arguments in favor of the negative impacts of devalua-
tions on output is the redistribution of income from employees to the owners of 
SURGXFWLRQIDFWRUVLHIURPODERUWRFDSLWDO&RQVLGHULQJWKDWHPSOR\HHVW\SLFDO-
ly have a higher propensity to consume than owners of capital goods, devaluation 
PD\UHVXOWLQUHGXFHGFRQVXPSWLRQDQGORZHUDJJUHJDWHGHPDQG'LD]$OHMDQGUR
%DKPDQL2VNRRHHDQG+DMLOHH
$QDQDO\VLVRIWKHFXUUHQWFULVLVDQGLWVFRPSDULVRQZLWKWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ
DQGVKRZVWKDWWKHUHGLVWULEXWLRQRILQFRPHLVQRWDVFOHDUO\GH¿QHGLQ
as it was during the previous crisis because the ratio of wages to total output is 
not decreasing. From this perspective, the current crisis differs substantially from 
the 2008–2009 crisis. Then, the number of people employed in the industrial sec-
tor dropped by nearly 10% y-o-y, causing a reduction in the ratio of wages to total 
output. Today, however, the decrease has not exceeded 2%. 
Thus, can we conclude that the employment reserves have been exhausted or 
that we have returned to the situation — normal for many countries — in which em-
ployee redundancies are the last to be made during a recession? In any case, as 
WKHIDOOLQJH[FKDQJHUDWHIRUWKHUXEOHVLJQL¿FDQWO\FRQWULEXWHVWRWKHUHGXFWLRQRI
XQLWODERUFRVWVLQFXUUHQF\WHUPVHQWHUSULVHVVWLOOUHIUDLQIURP³LQWHUQDOGHYDOXD-
WLRQ´LHHQJDJLQJLQPDVVUHGXQGDQFLHVDQGRUDEUXSWO\VORZGRZQWKHJURZWK
of wages in nominal terms relative to the growing shipments. Unlike 2009, when 
the ratio of wages to total products shipped by the industry evened out after many 
years of growth and even contracted substantially in the manufacturing sector for 
some time, today the ratio is still growing steadily, albeit slowly (see Fig. 3). 
$GLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUHRIWKHFXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQLQ5XVVLDLVWKHQRWLFHDEOHJURZWKLQ
SUHWD[SUR¿WVLQZKLFKDSSHDUVSDUDGR[LFDOJLYHQWKHVWDEOHUDWLRRIZDJHV
WRWRWDORXWSXWLQWKHLQGXVWULDOVHFWRUV$SSDUHQWO\WKHUHYDOXDWLRQRIH[SRUWHUDF-
counts in currency terms may have had its effect, as may the decrease in prices 
for electricity and gas for industrial consumers by half in currency terms in 2015, 
which made them the cheapest in the world, at least among the major economies. 
$FFRUGLQJWR5RVVWDWSUHWD[SUR¿WVJUHZE\LQQRPLQDOWHUPVLQWKHLQGXVWULDO
sector in the January–July 2015 period compared to the same period last year, i.e., 
IURP58%ELOOLRQWR58%ELOOLRQ$VDUHVXOWDFFRUGLQJWRRXUHVWL
PDWHVWKHSUR¿WPDUJLQRQVKLSPHQWVWKHUDWLRRISUHWD[SUR¿WWRJRRGVVKLSSHG
LQFUHDVHGWRGXULQJWKH¿UVWKDOIRIFRPSDUHGWRGXULQJWKHVDPH
period in 2014. Simultaneously, the potential for a scenario based on recovered 
JURZWKLQLQYHVWPHQWVGXHWRVHOI¿QDQFLQJE\HQWHUSULVHVVHHPVWREHVXJJHVWHG
E\WKHIDFWWKDWLQHDUO\GXHWRWKHGHYDOXDWLRQSUR¿WPDUJLQVRQVKLSPHQWV
in the manufacturing industry approached the interest rate on bank loans (Fig. 5). 
+RZHYHU WKHLQFUHDVLQJ SUR¿WV DQG VDOHV PDUJLQV QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ LQYHVW-
ment growth is not accelerating. On the contrary, our estimates show that, during 
the second quarter of 2015, falling investment rates by large and medium compa-
QLHVLQFUHDVHGURXJKO\¿YHIROG\R\IURPLQWKH¿UVWTXDUWHURIWRQHDUO\
11%. In agriculture and manufacturing, where there seems to be hope for import 
substitution, investments fell by more than 5% and 8%, respectively, y-o-y in real 
WHUPVGXULQJWKHVHFRQGTXDUWHUIROORZLQJDSRVLWLYHLQFUHPHQWLQWKH¿UVWTXDUWHU
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Simultaneously, the propensity to invest, i.e., the ratio of nominal investments 
WRSUHWD[SUR¿WVHH7DEOHKDVGURSSHGVKDUSO\LQPRVWVHFWRUVRIWKHHFRQRP\
IURPRYHUWKHSHULRGVSDQQLQJ±WRLQWKH¿UVWKDOIRI
DFURVVWKHHFRQRP\LQJHQHUDOIURPQHDUO\WRLQPLQLQJDQGPLQHUDOV
IURPWRLQFRPPHUFHHWF'RHVWKLVGURSPHDQWKDWSUR¿WVDUHEHLQJDO-
located elsewhere rather than for investments, accumulating in corporate reserve 
funds? This is not neces sarily the case, particularly given the fact that it could 
have been the source of funds which were used (at least partly) to repay foreign 
GHEWVRI5XVVLDQFRPSDQLHV$FFRUGLQJWRRXUHVWLPDWHVWKHLQFUHDVHLQQRPLQDO
SUHWD[SUR¿WVLQOHVVWKHQRPLQDOLQFUHDVHLQLQYHVWPHQWVLQ¿[HGFDSLWDO
is close to the amount repaid by Russian companies on their debts in foreign cur-
UHQFLHVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHSD\PHQWVFKHGXOHVRQWKH%DQNRI5XVVLDZHEVLWHLQ
their current ruble equivalent. 
7KHGHWHULRUDWLRQRIFRPSDQLHV¶¿QDQFLDOFRQGLWLRQGXHWRKHDYLHUGHEWSD\PHQW
burdens in foreign currencies is typical for post-devaluation periods and negatively 
affects output in the short run.8 For example, unlike the effect produced by transfer-
ULQJDGHYDOXDWLRQWRSULFHVWKHSDVVWKURXJKHIIHFWLWVLQÀXHQFHRQWKHHFRQRPLHV
of devaluing countries has not diminished over the past few decades and remains 
YHU\VLJQL¿FDQWVHH)UDQNHO,QLQ5XVVLDWKHSRVWGHYDOXDWLRQV\Q-
GURPHRI³¿QDQFLDOVWDUYDWLRQ´LVSDUWLFXODUO\PDQLIHVWHGLQDFRQVLGHUDEO\JUHDWHU
reduction in the foreign currency debts of companies in the real sector than during 
the devaluation in 2008 and 2009. Possible explanations include the more abrupt 
drop in the foreign exchange rate and the increased risks caused by the ruble’s free 
ÀRDW LQDGGLWLRQWR WKH¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQVZKLFKDUHKLQGHULQJGHEWUH¿QDQFLQJ
and forcing companies, for debt repayment, to use their own foreign currency re-
VHUYHVRU WRERUURZIURP WKH%DQNRI5XVVLD$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH%DQNRI5XVVLD
since its peak in July 2014, the total foreign currency debt of Russian companies, 
banks and the state has decreased by nearly USD 177 billion to approximately 
USD 556.2 billion at the beginning of July 2015. In the banking sector, it dropped 
E\86'ELOOLRQDQGLQWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRU²E\86'ELOOLRQ%HWZHHQ
 8 $SSDUHQWO\WKLVSKHQRPHQRQZDV¿UVWQRWHGE\*\OIDVRQDQG5LVDJHU
Fig. 5.3UR¿WPDUJLQRQVKLSPHQWVLQLQGXVWULDOVHFWRUVDQGUXEOHOHQGLQJUDWHV 
for industrial borrowers (%).
Note: 2015 — 1st half of the year. 
Sources: &(,&'DWD5XVVLDQ(FRQRPLF%DURPHWHU5(%DXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
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-XO\DQG$SULOIRUHLJQFXUUHQF\GHEWGHFUHDVHGE\86'ELOOLRQ
86'ELOOLRQDQG86'ELOOLRQUHVSHFWLYHO\7KXVWKHRXWÀRZRIIRUHLJQFXU-
rency resources from the economy turned out to be nearly USD 90 billion higher 
than during the previous exchange rate shock.
7KHWKUHDWRIDGHYDOXDWLRQLQÀDWLRQVSLUDODQGPDFURHFRQRPLFSROLF\
in the aftermath of a foreign exchange crisis
In the economic literature, the impact of devaluations on GDP growth (apart 
from the effects of income redistribution between labor and capital owners de-
VFULEHGLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQLVDQDO\]HGLQWHUPVRIDQXPEHURIRWKHUPLFUR
DQGPDFURHFRQRPLFHIIHFWV$OWKRXJKWKHHIIHFWRIGHYDOXDWLRQVDWWKHPLFUROHYHO
is viewed in the context of meeting the Marshall-Lerner condition, i.e., a certain 
ratio of export and import price elasticity (detailed below), at the macro level, it 
is considered to be based on meeting two other important economic policy prin-
ciples. Indeed, in order to meet these principles, it is necessary to pay special at-
WHQWLRQWRDQWLLQÀDWLRQDU\PHDVXUHVDQGPHDVXUHVIRULPSURYLQJWKHLQYHVWPHQW
attractiveness of the economy. 
%\IROORZLQJWKHVHSULQFLSOHVLQÀDWLRQFDQEHNHSWUHODWLYHO\ORZDIWHUDGH-
valuation (compared to the dynamics of nominal foreign exchange rate) for long 
SHULRGVRIWLPHPDNLQJWKHUHDOGHYDOXDWLRQVWDEOHDQGHIIHFWLYHLHVXI¿FLHQW
for the real sector to increase exports and substitute imports (Kataranova, 2010). 
Moreover, to sustain a positive impact of devaluation on output at the macro 
OHYHO LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR HQVXUH LWVSRVLWLYH HIIHFWRQ WKHLQÀRZRI FDSLWDO SDU-
ticularly because the nominal GDP, which grows during a period of devaluation 
while spurring demand for money, encourages an increase in interest rates and, 
FRQVHTXHQWO\DOORWKHUFRQGLWLRQVEHLQJHTXDOWKHLQÀRZRIIRUHLJQFDSLWDODQG
an improved balance of payments in general. 
Table.5DWLRRIQRPLQDOLQYHVWPHQWVLQ¿[HGFDSLWDOWRSUHWD[SUR¿WRYHUWKHSHULRG
2003 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Q1 Q2
Total economy 150 117 183 151 152 163 207 229 62 41
$JULFXOWXUH –1261 366 559 421 441 376 694 274 74 59
Mining and minerals 178 103 125 92 77 101 117 82 71 46
Manufacturing 98 57 117 76 75 81 126 229 39 25
chemicals 189 96 194 79 66 77 149 1505 36 25
metallurgy 38 32 108 50 65 73 106 98 13 10
machinery and  
equipment 152 162 151 155 133 128 179 492 169 100
electrical equipment, 
electronic and  
optical equipment 59 92 141 67 70 89 100 87 88 31
transport vehicles and 
equipment 120 –453 –104 748 133 155 215 –1574 127 71
Heat and power 261 389 311 221 843 579 919 719 86 99
Wholesale and retail  
trade 26 29 22 26 17 25 28 43 7 5
Transportation and 
communication 221 226 375 325 405 360 421 996 153 90
Sources:5RVVWDW&(,&'DWDDXWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQV
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*LYHQ WKDWPHHWLQJ WKHODWWHUFRQGLWLRQSRVHVDSUREOHPGXH WR WKH¿QDQFLDO
sanctions, another condition is gaining in importance, according to which the in-
FUHDVHLQQRPLQDORXWSXWPXVWH[FHHGWKHLQFUHDVHLQWKHVRFDOOHG³DEVRUSWLRQ´
i.e., aggregate domestic spending (consumption by households, investments, and 
JRYHUQPHQWVSHQGLQJ,QGHHGWKLVDOORZVLQÀDWLRQWREHNHSWVWDEOHDQGWKHWUDGH
balance to eventually improve. This result is possible if devaluation occurs when 
WKHRXWSXW JDS RI WKHHFRQRP\ DSSURDFKHV ]HUR LH ZKHQ SURGXFWLRQ IDFWRUV
DUHIXOO\ORDGHG,IWKHUHLVXQGHUXWLOL]HGSURGXFWLRQFDSDFLW\WKHQGRPHVWLFRXW-
put and absorption may grow at the same rate. 
In our opinion, given the current state of the Russian economy, in terms of pro-
duction capacity load, one must apply more stringent conditions, i.e., follow from 
the assumption of non-existent idle production factors. Indeed, although the data 
RQSURGXFWLRQFDSDFLW\XWLOL]DWLRQLQWKHLQGXVWULDOVHFWRUVXJJHVWDF\FOLFDOGH-
FOLQHWKHGDWDRQZRUNIRUFHXWLOL]DWLRQGRQRWVXSSRUWWKLVK\SRWKHVLV,QRWKHU
words, on the one hand, according to our calculations, taking into account the se-
OHFWHGGDWDSXEOLVKHGE\5RVVWDW UHJDUGLQJFDSDFLW\XWLOL]DWLRQ IRU W\SHVRI
products in 2013, the weighted average level in the industry9 in this sample was 
only 74%, whereas in 2014 and 2015, the cumulative output in the industry was 
negative.10 On the other hand, however, with actual unemployment at 5.3% in 
the summer of 2015 and taking into account that the full employment indicator 
is roughly the same for the Russian economy (Goryunov et al., 2015), there does 
not seem to be many unused production factors in the labor market.
Fig. 6 shows that the output follows the principle of not exceeding absorption, 
which provides for accelerated growth in the foreign trade balance in nominal terms 
DQG HQDEOHV LQÀDWLRQ FRQWURO 7KH5XVVLDQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V WLJKW PDFURHFRQRPLF
SROLF\DOWKRXJKQRWVDYLQJWKHHFRQRP\IURPUHFHVVLRQKHOSHGVWDELOL]HWKHVLWX-
ation: in 2015, government spending stagnated in real terms, whereas household 
spending and investments decreased faster than industrial output. However, the rates 
of production decline slowed down sharply by mid-summer compared to the same 
SHULRGRIWKHSUHYLRXV\HDU)LJRUDSSURDFKHG]HURLQVHDVRQDOO\DGMXVWHGIRUP
+RZHYHUMXGJLQJE\WKHFRXQWULHVWKDWKDYHH[SHULHQFHGPRQHWDU\DQG¿QDQ-
FLDOFULVHVDWLJKWPDFURHFRQRPLFSROLF\LVDQHFHVVDU\EXWLQVXI¿FLHQWFRQGLWLRQ
in order to overcome the consequences of a crisis regarding output and remove 
the threat of degradation from recession to depression. To overcome the reces-
VLRQ DV TXLFNO\ DV SRVVLEOH LQ DGGLWLRQ WR KDYLQJ D WLJKW ¿VFDO DQG EXGJHWDU\
policy and targeting aggregate spending (based on the principle of output not 
exceeding absorption), another important aspect is a relevant monetary policy. 
2QWKHRQHKDQGGXHWRKLJKLQÀDWLRQDVPHDVXUHGE\JOREDOVWDQGDUGVLQ
the 2000s, which dramatically lowered the competitiveness of Russian prod-
ucts and predetermined devaluation, Russia’s monetary authorities declared 
 9 The calculation was based on the share of production for each of the 59 separate types of goods in the added 
value of total industry.
 10 6LPXOWDQHRXVO\ DFFRUGLQJ WR 5RVVWDW¶V GDWD IRU  RXW RI WKH W\SHV RI SURGXFWV WKHXWLOL]DWLRQ RI
production capacity was below 85% (which can be considered as the full load) for 55 of them, whereas for 22, it 
was even below 50%. However, according to our estimates, the overall share of all 59 types of products for which 
data are available is only approximately 27% of the aggregate added value in the industry, whereas the proportion 
RI SURGXFWV IRUZKLFK WKHXWLOL]DWLRQ LV EHORZ GRHV QRW H[FHHG 7KXV WKHDVVHUWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ ORZ
FDSDFLW\XWLOL]DWLRQLQWKHLQGXVWULDOVHFWRUFDQRQO\EHFRQVLGHUHGDK\SRWKHVLVUHTXLULQJIXUWKHUYHUL¿FDWLRQ
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D WUDQVLWLRQ IURP WDUJHWLQJ WKHIRUHLJQ H[FKDQJH UDWH WR WDUJHWLQJ LQÀDWLRQ DQG
WKHIUHHÀRDWLQJUXEOHUDWHUHJLPHWRFXUEWKHGLVWRUWLQJLPSDFWRIWKHIRFXVHGH[-
FKDQJHUDWHSROLF\RQLQÀDWLRQ2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLQWKHUHVRXUFHEDVHG5XVVLDQ
HFRQRP\PDQ\SUHGLFWDQHDUIXWXUHUHGXFWLRQLQWKHLQÀRZRIIRUHLJQFXUUHQ-
F\PHDQLQJWKDWLWFRXOGZHOODSSURDFK]HURUHODWLYHWR*'3ZKLOHWKHQRWLFH-
DEOHFDSLWDOÀLJKWZLOOUHPDLQ+RZHYHUWKLVQRWLRQLVSUHJQDQWZLWKLQFUHDVHG
volatility on the foreign exchange market, as demonstra ted by the situation from 
the second half of 2013 to mid-2015. Indeed, macroeconomic volatility is viewed 
by many experts as the main negative manifestation of the resource curse for 
the real sector of resource-based economies, even under relatively stable condi-
Fig. 6. Nominal output, domestic spending (absorption), and foreign trade balance,  
from January 2006 through July 2015 (in ruble terms, y-o-y growth rate, %).
Sources:&(,&'DWDDXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
Fig. 7. 2XWSXWDQGGRPHVWLFGHPDQGLQUHDOWHUPVIURP-DQXDU\WKURXJK$XJXVW 
(y-o-y growth rate, %).
Source: &(,&'DWD
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tions (see, in particular, van der Ploeg, 2011). In light of this, the question seems 
WREHLVLWSRVVLEOHWRFRPELQHLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJDQGDTXLFNHFRQRPLFUHERXQG
under conditions of high volatility in the Russian economy? 
,Q RXU RSLQLRQ GXULQJ D WUDQVLWLRQ WR LQÀDWLRQ WDUJHWLQJZLWKLQ D UHVRXUFH
based economy, it is also necessary to consider that targeting the consumer price 
LQGH[&3,LQFOXGLQJLPSRUWHGJRRGVSULFHVZLOOHQKDQFHWKHSURF\FOLFDOLW\
LPPDQHQWO\ LQKHUHQW LQ DQ HFRQRP\ RI VXFK W\SH ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH%DQN RI
Russia will be forced to pursue a tighter monetary policy, i.e., to raise the key 
rate, while companies in the real sector will especially be in need of a lower 
key rate, given that it is highly likely that the economy will be in recession at 
WKDWPRPHQW7KHSUREOHP LV WKDW DFFHOHUDWLQJ LQÀDWLRQDQG FRQVHTXHQWO\ DQ
LQFUHDVHLQWKHNH\UDWHE\WKH%DQNRI5XVVLDFDQEHH[SHFWHGLQWKHHYHQWRI
an abrupt worsening of trade conditions, i.e., lower global oil prices. Following 
oil prices, the ruble exchange rate will also drop, with a rise in imported goods 
prices, whose share in the consumer basket is high due to the Dutch disease of 
WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\&RQVHTXHQWO\FRQVXPHULQÀDWLRQZLOOLQFUHDVHIROORZHG
by interest rates. Thus, the real sector will be hit by a double negative effect from 
falling oil revenues and from the monetary restrictions introduced by monetary 
DXWKRULWLHVWRWDUJHWFRQVXPHULQÀDWLRQ)LJ
The economic literature states that, for resource-based economies, there is no 
XQLYHUVDOIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHUHJLPHRUPRQHWDU\SROLF\DSSURDFKWKDWZLOO¿WDOO
FRXQWULHV)UDQNHO&RQVHTXHQWO\LQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJPD\EHXVHGE\PRQH
tary authorities in such economies, but only if they take into account that both 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\¿VFDODQGPRQHWDU\DQGSULYDWHFDSLWDOLQÀX[KDYHDWHQ-
dency towards more pro-cyclicality in resource-endowed countries (van der Ploeg 
DQG9HQDEOHV6LPXOWDQHRXVO\&3,WDUJHWLQJDVWDQGDUGIRUFRPPRGLW\
based economies, only makes it worse. 
Fig. 8. ,QGXVWU\DQGPRQHWDU\SROLF\LQGLFDWRUVIURP-DQXDU\WKURXJK$XJXVW
Note. 7KHUH¿QDQFLQJ UDWH OLQH RQ WKHJUDSK EHJLQQLQJ 6HSWHPEHU  LV UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKHNH\ UDWH RI
WKH%DQNRI5XVVLD
Sources: 5RVVWDW%DQNRI5XVVLDDXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
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So, what can be done to overcome this situation? First, we can consider re-
SODFLQJ&3,WDUJHWLQJZLWKWKHTXDQWLWDWLYHUHJXODWLRQRIDQRWKHUSULFHDJJUHJDWH
not including the price component of imported goods. Such an aggregate may be 
UHSUHVHQWHGIRUH[DPSOHE\WKHSURGXFHUSULFHLQGH[33,KRZHYHUWKLVLQGH[
ZRXOG UHTXLUH5RVVWDW WR UHVWUXFWXUH LWVDFWLYLWLHVEHFDXVHXQOLNH WKH&3, LW LV
calcu lated monthly rather than weekly, which will strongly reduce the prompt-
QHVVDQGHI¿FLHQF\RIPRQHWDU\SROLF\PHDVXUHV
6HFRQG WKH%DQN RI 5XVVLD FRXOG FRQWLQXH WDUJHWLQJ WKH&3, DQGPDQGDWRU\
budge tary interventions may be used to eliminate the pro-cyclicality factor. This 
would require the automatically linking of the key rate increase and the inclusion 
RIVRPHDXWRPDWLFHFRQRPLFVWDELOL]HUVEDVHGRQIRUH[DPSOHUHGXFLQJUDWHVIRU
the most important taxes or increasing government procurement. Here, we could 
EXLOGRQWKHH[SHULHQFHRI6RXWK$IULFDZKHUHLQWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKHVWKHPRQ-
HWDU\SROLF\ WDUJHWHG WKHLPSURYHPHQWRI FRQ¿GHQFH DPRQJHFRQRPLF DJHQWV E\
HPSKDVL]LQJWDUJHWVRIGHFUHDVLQJDQGVWDELOL]LQJLQÀDWLRQZKLOHWKHWDVNRIVWDELOL]-
LQJRXWSXWZDVDVVLJQHGWRWKHPLQLVWU\RI¿QDQFH)UDQNHOHWDO+RZHYHU
opportunities for the government to support the manufacturing industry will only re-
main if there are state-funded reserve funds, which should be preserved over a long 
period for guaranteed budget compensation to the real sector, in the event that there 
DUHFRQVHTXHQFHVIURPLQWHUYHQWLRQE\WKH%DQNRI5XVVLDWRVWDELOL]HLQÀDWLRQ
0RUHRYHUDQGDVQRWHGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJLVDSURFHVVRIPDLQ-
WDLQLQJDVWDEOHORZOHYHORILQÀDWLRQWKDWKDVDOUHDG\EHHQUHGXFHGZKHUHDVUH-
GXFLQJLQÀDWLRQGLVLQÀDWLRQLVDFRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQWSURFHVVWKDWUHTXLUHVRWKHU
PHWKRGV/RZLQÀDWLRQLVRIWHQUHJDUGHGDVDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRULQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJ
GXHWRWKH³FRPSOH[LW\RIIRUHFDVWLQJLQÀDWLRQDQGDFKLHYLQJLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWVXQ-
GHU FRQGLWLRQV RI KLJK LQÀDWLRQ YRODWLOLW\´ +DPPRQG  6LPXOWDQHRXVO\
JOREDOH[SHULHQFHDUJXHVWKDWDÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWHLVDQDWWULEXWHIRUWDUJHWLQJ
DQDOUHDG\ORZLQÀDWLRQZKLOHDWWKHVWDJHRIUHGXFLQJLQÀDWLRQWRDWDUJHWOHYHO
DÀRDWLQJUDWHPD\EHXQDFFHSWDEOHJLYHQWKDWLWZLOOFRPSOLFDWHGLVLQÀDWLRQHV-
pecially in a resource-based economy because frequent and unpredictable changes 
LQFRPPRGLW\SULFHVZLOOOHDGWRH[FKDQJHUDWHDQGLQÀDWLRQXSVXUJHV7KXVIRU
the current state of the Russian economy, which is going through a period of dis-
LQÀDWLRQDIUHHÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWHPD\EHIDUIURPWKHRSWLPDOSROLF\UHJLPH
5. On the subject of devaluation pessimism and the impact of devaluations 
on output
,QGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVDXWKRULWLHVYHU\RIWHQH[KLELWVRFDOOHG³GHYDOXDWLRQ
SHVVLPLVP´ZKHQIHDULQJWKHDGYHUVHLPSDFWVRIDQDWLRQDOFXUUHQF\GHYDOXDWLRQ
on the economic situation, they try different means to prevent an exchange rate 
from collapsing, thus postponing an inevitable wreck. The reasons for this pessi-
mism are not only the usual political and economic consequences of the exchange 
rate shock but also the weak response of exports and imports to changes in relative 
prices, i.e., their low price elasticity. In the standard case (under stable foreign 
trade conditions), devaluation is considered effective, i.e., it improves the trade 
EDODQFH LI XQGHU D ]HUR WUDGH EDODQFH WKHH[SRUW DQG LPSRUW SULFH HODVWLFLWLHV
are more than one in absolute terms (the Marshall-Lerner condition). Therefore, 
WKHGHYDOXDWLRQSHVVLPLVPRIDXWKRULWLHVLVDOVRFDOOHG³HODVWLFLW\SHVVLPLVP´
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In Russia’s case, the effect of devaluation on the trade balance in ruble terms 
LVGH¿QHGLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHH[FKDQJHUDWHE\WUDGLQJFRQGLWLRQVE\RLOSULFHV
ZKLFKKDYHEHFRPHWZLFHDVEDG+RZHYHUDOWKRXJKLQWKH¿UVWKDOIRI
Russia’s commodity exports decreased by almost 30% and imports by approxi-
mately 40% in currency terms, the nominal net exports in ruble terms, taking into 
DFFRXQWWKHGHYDOXDWLRQIDFWRULQFUHDVHGE\DWOHDVWWKHDYHUDJH58%86'
rate changed from 34.7 to 57 rubles per US dollar over the same period), which, 
undoubtedly, should encourage GDP growth. Nevertheless, this factor alone does 
not provide a way out of the recession in the near future because the share of 
QHWH[SRUWVLQWKH*'3LVQRWODUJHEHORZDQGWKHGHÀDWRULVKLJKGXHWR
WKHVLJQL¿FDQWDSSUHFLDWLRQRILPSRUWHGJRRGV
In quantitative terms, the extent of impact from growing exports and imports 
RQ*'3IROORZLQJDGHYDOXDWLRQLVNQRZQWREHGH¿QHGRQRQHKDQGE\WKHLU
price elasticity and, on the other hand, by the presence of the so-called J-curve, 
i.e., a lag in the growth in exports due to the need for producers to adapt to new 
conditions and new markets. To calculate Russia’s export and import price elasti-
FLWLHVZHXVHGTXDUWHUO\GDWDSURYLGHGE\WKH2(&'RQQDWLRQDODFFRXQWVZLWK
seasonal factors removed for the period from 1995 to 2014, in addition to data 
SURYLGHG E\ WKH%DQN IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6HWWOHPHQWV %,6 UHJDUGLQJ WUHQGV LQ
the nominal and real effective exchange rates of the national currency (Fig. 9). 
(ODVWLFLW\ ZDV FDOFXODWHG LQ QRUPDOL]HG ¿UVWRUGHU GLIIHUHQFHV LH LQ JURZWK
rates against the previous quarter.11 
$OWKRXJKWKHFDOFXODWLRQVVKRZHGWKDWWKH0DUVKDOO/HUQHUFRQGLWLRQZDVQRWPHW
given the trends in the physical volumes of exports and imports (the sum of the price 
elasticities is less than 1.0 and equals 0.6 in absolute value), there should be no elasti-
city pessimism in Russia. Indeed, this is because, under conditions of a positive foreign 
 11 Testing the data in absolute levels demonstrated their non-stationary nature and, simultaneously, their lack 
of co-integration. 
Fig. 9. Real effective exchange rate of the Russian ruble, physical imports and exports,  
1996Q1 — 2015Q2 (on a quarterly basis, y-o-y, %).
Sources: &(,&'DWD%,6DXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
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WUDGHEDODQFHEHIRUH WKHGHYDOXDWLRQ WKHLQÀXHQFHRIQHW H[SRUWVRQ*'3JURZWK
ZLOODOVREHSRVLWLYHDIWHUWKLVPRUHRYHULQWKHHYHQWRIDGHFUHDVLQJUHDOHIIHFWLYH
exchange rate by an annual average of 20% in 2015, it can be estimated at roughly 
3.5 p.p. of GDP in annual terms. The implication is that the changes in 2015 rate 
 account for approximately half of the actual positive contribution of net exports to 
*'3DSSUR[LPDWHO\SSLQWKH¿UVWKDOIRIDFFRUGLQJWRRXUHVWLPDWHV
6LPXOWDQHRXVO\GXULQJWKH¿UVWKDOIRIH[SRUWVLQSK\VLFDOYROXPHVLQ-
creased by approximately 3% y-o-y, which, although pointing to a very prompt 
response by exports to the devaluation, is considerably lower than the increase 
observed in Russia after the devaluations in 1998 and 2008–2009.12 Meanwhile, 
to date, there is no noticeable growth in Russia’s manufacturing goods exports,13 
and the dominant raw materials in Russia’s exports prevent growth in net exports 
from ensuring an economic rebound. 
7KHFRQVLGHUDEOHH[FHVVRIEDQNORDQUDWHVRYHUSUR¿WPDUJLQVIRUERWKVKLS-
ments14 and assets15VHUYHGDVDVLJQL¿FDQWIDFWRULQWKHVORZGRZQRIHFRQRPLF
growth before the crisis. For this reason, the potential positive effects of the de-
YDOXDWLRQRQH[SRUWSUR¿WPDUJLQVDQGLPSRUWVXEVWLWXWLRQDFWLYLWLHVDUHGLI¿FXOW
to overestimate, especially considering the increase in lending rates in 2015 to 
DWOHDVWSDRQUXEOHORDQVDFFRUGLQJWR5(%DQGWKH¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQV
Our calculations based on Rosstat data show that the devaluation is having 
a positive impact on export margins in currency terms across most segments of 
the manufacturing industry (Fig. 10), given that the proportion of imports in to-
tal costs did not exceed 9% on average across the manufacturing industry before 
the devaluation. Following from a 50% drop in the nominal ruble exchange rate, 
in the best-case scenario, i.e., in the event that costs formed in Russia are cut in 
half in currency terms (and the simultaneous doubling in currency terms of ex-
penses for imported commodities, materials and components), we may observe 
DQLQFUHDVHLQSUR¿WPDUJLQVIRUH[SRUWHGJRRGVLQFXUUHQF\WHUPVE\SSRQ
average across the manufacturing sector (from 8.8% in January-September 2014 
to 47% after the devaluation). This conclusion follows on from the calculations 
EDVHG RQ WKHGDWD IURP5RVVWDW VWDWLVWLFDO )RUP ] JLYHQ WKHK\SRWKHWLFDO DV-
sumption of the full mutual replaceability of Russian and foreign products and 
equality between domestic and foreign prices and sales in currency terms before 
DQGDIWHUWKHGHYDOXDWLRQ7KHQXPEHURISURGXFWVZLWKDQHJDWLYHSUR¿WPDUJLQRQ
export markets before and after the devaluation drops sharply from 36 (the top and 
bottom left-hand quadrants on Fig. 10) to 3 (the bottom two quadrants on Fig. 10). 
 12 It was noted in the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2015) that in 1998, Russia experienced a pronounced 
positive response in real exports to the ruble exchange rate depreciation, which is not typical for a strong 
devaluation accompanied by a banking crisis. In the standard case, exports hardly grow under such conditions . 
 13 $QDQDO\VLVRIWKH)HGHUDO&XVWRPV6HUYLFHGDWDVKRZVWKDWGXULQJWKH¿UVWKDOIRISK\VLFDOH[SRUWV
increased for 20 products y-o-y. Simultaneously, 5 products demonstrated growth in both physical and value 
WHUPVZLWKPRVW EHLQJ UDZPDWHULDOV JRRGV UH¿QHG FRSSHU UDZ DOXPLQXP SRWDVVLXPEDVHG IHUWLOL]HUV ,Q
addition, we can also name coke and electricity.
 14 2XUFDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQ5RVVWDWGDWDVKRZWKDWSUR¿WPDUJLQVRIVKLSPHQWVZHUHDFURVVWKHLQGXVWULDO
sector, nearly 24.8% in mining and minerals, 3.1% in manufacturing, and 3.7% in the production and distribution 
of electricity, gas and water in 2014.
 15 ,QSUR¿WPDUJLQVRQDVVHWVZHUHLQ5XVVLD¶VPDQXIDFWXULQJLQGXVWU\DJDLQVWLQ
14.6% (12.7%) in mining and minerals, and 1.4% (1.3%) in the production and distribution of electricity, gas 
and water (based on Rosstat data).
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From the perspective of the needs of the real sector of the economy, the level 
of the ruble’s foreign exchange rate as of September 2015 may be classed as 
³HTXLOLEULXP´EHFDXVHLWHQVXUHVSRVLWLYHSUR¿WPDUJLQVIRUH[SRUWVLQDQDEVROXWH
majority of manufacturing segments and decreases the need for selective govern-
ment support. In three sectors, the proportion of imports is over 50% of the costs, 
DQG WKHSUR¿WPDUJLQRIH[SRUWV LVQHJDWLYHHYHQXQGHU WKHWZRWLPHUXEOHGH-
valuation: these include producers of devices for receiving, recording and re-
producing sounds and images, producers of pesticides and other agrochemical 
products, and producers of machinery and equipment for agriculture and forestry. 
+RZHYHURQHVKRXOGQRWIRUJHWWKDWHYHQZLWKWKLVW\SHRIJURZWKLQH[SRUWSUR¿W
margins and a small number of those negatively affected by the appreciation of 
imported raw materials and components, the real positive effect of the devalua-
WLRQRQRXWSXWLVQRWVLJQL¿FDQWJLYHQWKDWWKHVKDUHRIPDQXIDFWXUHGJRRGVLQ
overall Russian exports is low (approximately 10%) and increasing it will require 
investments and time. 
Speaking of the positive impact of devaluations on import substitution, one 
should bear in mind that the exchange rate shock is accompanied by increased in-
ÀDWLRQDQGORZHUSXUFKDVLQJSRZHUIRUKRXVHKROGVDQGHQWHUSULVHVZKLFKSDUWO\
offsets the positive result of the growing price competitiveness of Russian pro-
ducers in the domestic market. The strong devaluation incentive notwithstanding, 
RQO\IRXUPDMRULQGXVWULDOVHFWRUVLQFUHDVHGWKHLURXWSXWLQ-DQXDU\±$XJXVW
compared with the same period last year. Regarding minor segments, accele rated 
growth rates (over 3% y-o-y) were calculated for 14 segments. In 8 of them (out 
RI DSSUR[LPDWHO\  LGHQWL¿HG DW WKLV FODVVL¿FDWLRQ OHYHO5XVVLDQ SURGXFHUV
competed with imports, whereas the rest were oriented towards exports. This 
¿QGLQJVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHJURZWKUDWHLQPDQXIDFWXULQJH[SRUWVDQGLPSRUWVXEVWL-
tution remains somewhat low. It is important to sustain the positive contribution 
of net exports, whose upward momentum typically disappears after devaluation 
in Russia (see Fig. 9) with an increase in investment, which began to contract 
HYHQEHIRUHWKHFULVLV&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHUHDVRQVIRUWKHLUVORZGRZQDUHQRWRQO\
Fig. 10.3UR¿WPDUJLQVRQVDOHVEHIRUH-DQXDU\±6HSWHPEHUDQGDIWHUWKHGHYDOXDWLRQ 
LQLQGXVWULDOVHFWRUVUHFRUGHGE\5RVVWDWLQ)RUP]
Sources: 5RVVWDWDXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
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caused by devaluation. The recovery process for personal income and household 
consumption, which has a share in the GDP approximately 2.5 times greater than 
that of investments, will not be fast and should follow an improvement in the eco-
QRPLFFRQMXQFWXUHDVDZKROHDQGWKHUHVWUXFWXULQJRISURGXFWLRQ$WOHDVWHDUOLHU
in the Russian economy, judging by our calculations,16 it was GDP growth that 
³OHG´SHUVRQDOFRQVXPSWLRQQRWYLFHYHUVDDOWKRXJKWKHWUDMHFWRULHVRIWKHVHLQ-
dicators are very similar). 
6. Structural problems as a factor in the Russian devaluation  
of 2014 and 2015
The clearly visible slowdown in the Russian economy, even with a stable 
global oil prices from 2011 to 2013, may have been caused by structural prob-
lems. This type of slowdown, according to the facts described above, could have 
been a type of leading indicator, predicting, with a 1–2 year lag, the devalua-
tion of the national currency and the ensuing additional slowdown in economic 
growth rates by approximately 2 p.p. against the pre-devaluation level. Thus, 
the slowdown of Russia’s GDP in 2013, when the growth rate decreased to 1.3% 
compared to 3.4% and 4.3% in the previous two years, could have been a type 
of leading indicator of devaluation, which, in a certain form, would have oc-
FXUUHG UHJDUGOHVVRI WKHIDOOLQJRLO SULFHV DQG¿QDQFLDO DQGRWKHU VDQFWLRQV ,Q
principle, there could have been no recession in Russia in the event of stable oil 
prices because the drop in GDP during the devaluation year is half as probable 
DV LWV JURZWK LQ JHQHUDO %XVVLqUH HWDO 7KLV SKHQRPHQRQPDNHV HFR-
nomic growth even more probable in the year following the exchange rate shock. 
$QRWKHUDUJXPHQW LQ IDYRURI WKHK\SRWKHVLVFRQFHUQLQJVWUXFWXUDODQG LQVWLWX-
tional causes behind the Russian economic slowdown is that, in other resource-
EDVHGFRXQWULHVZLWKDÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJH UDWHZKHUH WKHUDWH LVQRW DUWL¿FLDOO\
¿[HGXQOLNHPDQ\FRXQWULHV LQ WKH0LGGOH(DVWDIWHU WKHVKDUSGHFOLQH LQRLO
prices in 2014, the nominal and real effective exchange rates experienced a much 
smaller decrease than they did in Russia.17
In our opinion, given lower oil prices, the rates of Russia’s GDP growth can 
hardly recover without accelerating the manufacturing industry because the servi-
ces sector, which was the main contributor to growth in the Russian economy in 
WKHVKDV ORVW LWV ³IHHG´ IURPRLODQGJDVEXVLQHVV UHQW IRU D ORQJ WLPH WR
FRPHLIQRWIRUHYHUDQGWKXVZLOO¿QGLWKDUGWRUHPDLQDQLQGHSHQGHQWIDFWRULQ
economic growth (Fig. 11). In any case, for Russia, endowed with natural resour-
ces, it is their deep processing and the development of the complementary services 
sector that appear to be suitable areas for diversifying the economy, increasing 
demand for innovations and removing resource dependence. 
However, restoring the competitive strength of the manufacturing industry 
LV IDU IURP VLPSOH$OWKRXJK WKHODWWHU GHYHORSHG UDSLGO\ GXULQJ WKH¿UVW KDOI
of the 2000s after a failure in the 1990s, it began to show clear signs of slow-
 16 ,QSDUWLFXODUWKLV¿QGLQJLVEDVHGRQWKH*UDQJHUFDXVDOLW\WHVWWKDWZHUDQ
 17 )RUH[DPSOHDFFRUGLQJ WR WKH%DQNIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HWWOHPHQWV LQ WKHQRPLQDOHIIHFWLYHH[FKDQJH
rate of the Russian ruble fell by 39.4% and the real effective exchange rate by 29.4% against June 2014, whereas 
WKHVDPH LQGLFDWRUV LQ$XVWUDOLD1RUZD\DQG0H[LFRZHUH±±DQG±DQG±±
and –14.1%, respectively.
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ing down after the 2008–2009 crisis. The 2015 data provide new evidence of 
GHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQ:KHUHDV WKHHQWLUH LQGXVWULDO SURGXFWLRQ GHFOLQHG E\ 
\R\LQ-DQXDU\±$XJXVWDQGWKHH[WUDFWLQJLQGXVWU\DQGSRZHUVHFWRUSUH-
served almost all of their output (growth rates of 0.1% and –0.3%, respectively), 
production decreased by 4.5% in the manufacturing industry.
,WLVVRPHWLPHVVDLGWKDWWKHUHVRXUFHFXUVHDQGDFFHOHUDWHGGHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQ
i.e., the Dutch disease, actually mean a transition of the economy from one equi-
librium to another (Graham, 1995). We could agree with this proposition if an ex-
SRUWERRPZDVLQGH¿QLWH+RZHYHUWKDWLVQRWWKHFDVH,QUHDOLW\WKHEHJLQQLQJ
RIDQH[SRUWERRPLVDFFRPSDQLHGE\RQHVHWRISUREOHPVGHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQRI
the economy and degradation of agriculture), whereas its ending is accompanied 
by another, in particular the inability to quickly restore the degraded manufactur-
ing and agricultural industries due to technological backwardness, while the con-
tribution to economic growth from the resource sector contracts dramatically. 
7KXVWKHHFRQRPLFEDFNZDUGQHVVFDQEH¿[HGIRUDORQJSHULRGRIWLPHHYHQ
despite the considerable amount of natural resources (Sheng, 2011).
$VVKRZQ ORQJEHIRUH WKHFXUUHQWFULVLVEDVHGRQDFDOFXODWLRQRI WKHORQJ
term co-integration ratio for the Russian economy, a 1% increase in oil prices 
OHDGV WR  SS LQFUHDVH LQ5XVVLD¶V*'3 $OJLHUL $V LV SUHVXPHG
LQWKHVHFDOFXODWLRQVWKHSRVLWLYHLQÀXHQFHRQ*'3RILQFUHDVLQJRLOSULFHVGXH
to growing demand outbalances the negative impact on the economy due to 
the strengthening real ruble exchange rate and the decreasing competitiveness of 
WKHPDQXIDFWXULQJLQGXVWU\%\DVVXPLQJWKHV\PPHWULFDOQDWXUHRIWKHUHVSRQVH
of macro indicators to changes in oil prices, their current decline may lead to 
a recession because lower demand will not be fully offset by growing competi-
tiveness due to a lower real effective exchange rate of the ruble. In this case, 
the cumulative decline in GDP may be 8.5–9.0% of GDP, regardless of the im-
pact of the inventories factor, which accounted, recall, for approximately 3/4 of 
WKHGHFUHDVHLQ5XVVLD¶V*'3LQ$VVXFKZHFDQQRWKRSHIRUDQDXWR
matic and quick stimulating effect from the devaluation of the Russian ruble in 
2014 and 2015. In the event of inertial developments, further postponement of 
Fig. 11.'\QDPLFVRIRXWSXWLQWKHVHFWRUVRIWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\IURPWRWKH¿UVWKDOIRI
Sources: 5RVVWDWDXWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
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VWUXFWXUDO UHIRUPV DLPHG DW WKHGHEXUHDXFUDWL]DWLRQ DQGGHPRQRSROL]DWLRQRI
the economy, and a lowering of the rigidity of the labor market, the recession in 
the Russian economy could last for at least two or three years. 
This estimate qualitatively corresponds to our calculations based on the mid-
term econometric model of the Russian economy, which, in forecasts as late as 
September 2015, predict a continued recession in 2016 and 2017 (although with 
the GDP falling at lower rates than in 2015).18 We will also observe a decline in 
wages, which (even despite the recession), in 2015, are still growing in nominal 
WHUPV(PSOR\PHQWZLOOFRQWUDFWPRUHFRQVLGHUDEO\WKDQLQWKH¿UVWKDOIRI
possibly leading to social implications. 
To increase exports and promote import substitution, even with the most favor-
able price ratios resulting from the devaluation, the industry requires additional 
labor resources, new production capacities, and infrastructure. They will hardly 
be available due to the labor market rigidity, low intensity of the investment pro-
FHVVEHIRUHWKHFULVLVDQGLPSHUIHFW³UXOHVRIWKHJDPH´LQWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\
Without resolving these issues, we cannot build an economic system that would be 
more resilient and less exposed to price and exchange rate shocks. 
7. Conclusion
The article uses a review of the literature regarding the effect of devaluations 
on output and other macro indicators in order to identify four conditions that 
determine the restrictive impact of devaluation in terms of GDP dynamics. Three 
of these are associated with the impact of the devaluation on aggregate demand 
DQGWKHIRXUWKRQH²ZLWKLWVHIIHFWRQDJJUHJDWHVXSSO\7KH¿UVWWKUHHLQFOXGH
the redistribution of income from economic agents with a high propensity to con-
sume to agents with a low propensity (from owners of labor to owners of capital 
JRRGVWKHHIIHFWRIRXWVWULSSLQJLQÀDWLRQZKHUHDQRPLQDOGHYDOXDWLRQPD\OHDG
WRDGHFOLQHLQDJJUHJDWHGHPDQGGXHWRXQFRQWUROOHGSULFHJURZWKDQGWKHHIIHFW
of low export and import price elasticities, where the balance of trade expressed 
in the national currency may decline due to devaluation, leading to recession. 
The fourth condition is that devaluation may have an adverse effect on supply 
due to the appreciation of imported intermediate goods and to higher domestic 
LQWHUHVWUDWHVDQGZDJHVFDXVHGE\DFFHOHUDWLQJLQÀDWLRQ
This article shows that although only two of the four conditions of restric-
tive effects from devaluation are present in one form or another in the Russian 
economy (the redistribution of income from labor to capital and the low export 
and import price elasticities), devaluation may still lead to recession, at least in 
2015 and 2016. The reasons for this are the low propensity of economic agents 
that own capital goods to invest and structural problems in the economy, which 
are possibly indicated by the devaluation of the Russian ruble in 2014 and 2015. 
7KHRIWTXRWHGFDVH VHHHJ)UDQNHOGHVFULELQJKRZDIWHU WKH%ULWLVK
SRXQG GHYDOXDWLRQ LQ  WKH&KDQFHOORU RI WKH([FKHTXHU %ULWLVK ¿QDQFH
minister) was so happy that he sang in the shower is hardly likely to have any 
bearing on the current situation in Russia. 
 18 6HH WKHPLGWHUP IRUHFDVW IRU WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\ GHYHORSPHQW E\ WKH&HQWUH RI'HYHORSPHQW ,QVWLWXWH
1DWLRQDO5HVHDUFK8QLYHUVLW\+LJKHU6FKRRORI(FRQRPLFVKWWSGFHQWHUUXFDWHJRU\SHULRGLFKHVNLHRE]RU\QHS
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